Introduction
It is a hallmark of positivism that it aspired to a neutral standpoint between apparently competing metaphysical or ontological positions. Positivists sought a starting point for philosophy, and for human knowledge, free of metaphysical or (taking the term in a fairly rich sense) ontological commitment. But they also tended to equate the real with the given in experience; so the positivist attempt to deny metaphysics without being metaphysical, generates a paradox familiar in post Kantian philosophy. Ernst Mach's The Analysis of Sensations, which comprises what is usually regarded as a phenomenalist construction of the world, represents an early and crude variety of positivist neutralism. However, as argued in the precursor to this article, Mach could not preserve the neutrality of his elements, and his 'neutral monism' collapses into the non neutral standpoints of either Millian phenomenalism or direct realism. Carnap's construction in Der Logische Aufbau der Welt was, in contrast to that of his predecessor, one of the earliest attempts to separate semantic from ontological questions, and thus achieve an effective neutrality with regard to the latter. Nonetheless, I will argue, the ambiguities of Mach's neutral monist standpoint continued to manifest themselves in the Aufbau, and the rationale for this later attempt at ontological neutrality remains in many ways bafflingly obscure.

Introduction
"Matter, then, may be defined as the Permanent Possibility of Sensation". With this famous phrase, Mill put phenomenalism firmly on the philosophical map. The origins of phenomenalism - the standpoint which regards sensations as the basic constituents of reality, and attempts to construct the external world from sensations and the possibilities of sensation - can be traced back to Berkeley. But the analysis of matter as the "permanent possibility of sensation", and the attempted application of that analysis to mind, which comprise the most well-known chapters of Mill's An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, is the first developed presentation of the doctrine. After Mill, a commitment to phenomenalism became standard among scientific philosophers, until superseded by physicalism in the 1930's. Figures associated with the doctrine included Mach, Russell, Carnap, C.I. Lewis and A.J. Ayer, and with these it took an increasingly "linguistic" or "semantic" form.

Introduction
...one of the greatest advantages and attractions of true positivism seems to me to be the antisolipsistic attitude which characterizes it from the very beginning...perhaps the philosophy of Mach and Avenarius [is] one of the most consistent attempts to avoid [solipsism]... ...primitive experience is absolutely neutral...To see that primitive experience is not first person experience seems to me to be one of the most important steps which philosophy must take towards the clarification of its deepest problems.
These quotations from Schlick's late article "Meaning and Verification" (1936) illustrate the constant positivist desire to eliminate the subject, to transcend subjectivity.1 This ostensibly anti solipsistic "neutralism" was, as Schlick records, expressed earlier in the "neutral monist" philosophy of his predecessor as Professor of the History and Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences at Vienna, Ernst Mach. The present article is the first of two, concerned to explain the development and influence of this aspect of positivist "neutralism" from Mach to the Vienna Circle.

Abstract
Reid rejects the image theory - the representative or indirect realist position - that memory-judgments are inferred from or otherwise justified by a present image or introspectible state. He also rejects the trace theory, which regards memories as essentially traces in the brain. In contrast he argues for a direct knowledge account in which personal memory yields unmediated knowledge of the past. He asserts the reliability of memory, not in currently fashionable terms as a reliable belief-forming process, but more elusively as a principle of Commonsense. There is a contemporary consensus against Reid's position. I argue that Reid's critique is essentially sound, and that the consensus is mistaken; personal memory judgments are spontaneous and non-inferential in the same way as perceptual judgments. But I question Reid's account of the connection between personal memory and personal identity. My primary concern is rationally reconstructive rather than scholarly, and downplays recent interpretations of Reid's faculty psychology as a precursor of functionalism and other scientific philosophies of mind.

Introduction
The central aim of this article is to criticise the received opinion that delusions are beliefs. I will argue that in many psychotic and non-psychotic cases, the basic level of description of delusion falls short of the ascription of belief. In monothematic, behaviourally inert cases at least, I maintain that although the delusion shares some features of belief, the disanalogies are sufficient to justify withholding a clear belief-attribution. My thesis is not quite that in many cases delusions are not beliefs; rather, it is that there is no fact of the matter concerning whether S believes that p.

Abstract
Proprioception provides knowledge of bodily position and movement. This article offers a critique of representative and perceptual models, and proposes instead that proprioception yields direct, immediate knowledge of one's body. This account is analogous to a direct knowledge account of memory. The knowledge is non-inferential, and I do not have to do anything to acquire it. Indeed, I do not really "acquire" it at all; I "just know" that my legs are crossed. Proprioception seemingly involves knowledge of an object, yet that knowledge is groundless; it is intermediate between perceptual knowledge from the five senses, and sensations such as pain. This is basic knowledge of one's body in the same sense that one moves one's body basically - as in normal uses of "I am moving my arm". Proprioception must not be assimilated to propositional knowledge based on evidence. "He knows that his legs are crossed" is mostly as absurd as "He knows he's in pain". More generally, the case of proprioception suggests that basic knowledge, and not basic belief, is fundamental.

Abstract
The concept of belief is profoundly puzzling. It has affinities both with conscious states and with dispositions, and as a result some writers have wanted to analyse it into two distinct concepts. The conception of belief as judgment, feeling or mental act - as a mode of conscious thought - persisted at least from Descartes and Hume to Russell and Ramsay. Ryle and Wittgenstein effectively undermined this conception, opening the way for the present consensus that belief is a complex behavioural disposition, or a functional or informational state underlying such a disposition - or, most usually, a combination of these. I will refer to the consensus as the disposition model.

Abstract
The account of personal identity that follows may at first sight appear to offer a 'psychological' criterion, since it lends support to Locke's claim that memory suffices for personal identity. But I am not engaged in the traditional project of providing necessary and sufficient conditions whose specification does not presuppose identity. There are no such criteria. The essentially self-conscious ways of knowing about oneself, including memory, constitute, and do not merely furnish evidence for, personal identity; there is a benign circularity here. As I shall argue, the traditional distinction between 'psychological' and 'bodily' criteria is ill-founded, since, for self-conscious subjects, the body is not simply a mass of physicall 'stuff', and 'bodily' criteria have an essential psychological component. Thus in other respects my account is not Lockean; his sharp distinction between the human being and the person was, I think, disasterous. It was an inspiration for the current science-fiction approach to personal identity, an approach which continues to exhibit all the philosophical insight of a Star Trek convention.

Introduction
In the discussion of criticism in the arts, and indeed of aesthetics in general, the following concepts seem to go together: appreciation, beauty, connoisseurship, evaluation, taste, quality. They are contrasted with: interpretation, meaning, theory, truth, understanding. I believe that the opposition between these two sets of concepts must be overcome, and in particular I am concerned to locate the truth inherent in a so-called "taste" aesthetic, under which a commitment to connoisseurship is often subsumed. In doing so, I will be concerned to re-evaluate conceptions of artistic criticism current in the eighteenth century, comparing them favourably with some assumptions held by twentieth-century art history. I conclude that, while the notion of connoisseurship in particular and criticism in general has come under increasing attack from the direction of the academic discipline of art history, it may be vindicated through a defence of an appreciative model of artistic criticism. Connoisseurship is traditionally the prototype for appreciation, and I will advocate a democratic treatment of both appreciation and connoisseurship by appealing to eighteenth-century treatments by David Hume and Immanuel Kant.

Introduction
My question is: what is the relation between improvised and classical music? In particular, in what sense is jazz an art music? This music has many of the features of art music, despite evidently being less contrived than the great works of the Western canon. Jazz is still able to draw for its material on the charms of ephemeral pop music - what Noel Coward described dismissively as the "potency of cheap music" - which consist in their powers of association for individual listeners. When those materials are used as they are in jazz, an art of great power can be created. Jazz provides a test case in the dialectic between popular and art music. [rw] This dialectic gives rise to central aesthetic questions which are much-discussed in musicology and sociology of music, but whose deeper roots philosophical aesthetics tends to neglect. My suggestion is that jazz shares some of the features of Western art music - that apparently unique, autonomous art music which contrasts with traditional art musics such as gagaku, courtly gamelan and Indian classical music. Unlike Western art music, however, jazz is essentially an art music based on popular materials, whose artistry consists not in composition, but in the improvisation on those materials.

Introduction
Adorno's unique brand of Western Marxism, in which the ideals of art for art's sake and absolute music remain salient, presents a complex and elusive treatment of the autonomy of art, which it is the task of this article to examine. It may seem puzzling how any kind of Marxist could believe in the autonomy of art. Autonomy is normally taken to mean that art is governed by its own rules and laws, and that artistic value makes no reference to social or political value. Autonomy is taken to oppose the economic conditioning of culture assumed by classical Marxism. However, Western Marxism questioned the base/superstructure model, and Adorno's version of it offers the subtlest account of that relation. It is a mark of the perspicacity of Adorno's treatment that he was able to do justice both to the social situation of art and music, and to their autonomy status - indeed he did justice to each through the other. Adorno delineates the functionlessness of art, and its social situation in virtue of that functionlessness. For Adorno, autonomous artworks have a social situation but - as I will put it - no direct social function: "Insofar as a social function may be predicated of works of art, it is the function of having no function". That is, autonomous art has as its "purpose" the creation of something without direct purpose or function - pre-bourgeois art such as religious or theatre music, in contrast, does have a direct social function. Another way of putting this claim is to say that autonomous art constitutes an autonomous practice that does not serve any other practice. That is, it is an end in itself - just as religious practice is also autonomous and lacks direct social function. Adorno's picture is that as the artist became free of church and aristocratic patronage towards the end of the 18th century, their work simultaneously became autonomous and commodified through entry into the capitalist market-place.

Abstract
This article offers a vindication of the indeterminacy of natural beauty, first through a dissolution of the antinomy between a critical and a positive aesthetics of nature, then through a resolution of the frame problem. These arguments are developed, finally, through a defence of the reciprocity thesis prominent in post-Kantian aesthetics, which claims that there is a conceptual connection between the aesthetic appreciation of art and that of nature. I am concerned to defend indeterminacy against objections from environmental aesthetics and aesthetic realism, and to give qualified support to Adorno's historicist position in Aesthetic Theory. Underlying my approach is a Kantian emphasis on the ubiquity of the aesthetic and the democracy of taste.

Abstract
According to the acousmatic thesis defended by Roger Scruton and others, to hear sounds as music is to divorce them from the source or cause of their production. Non-acousmatic experience involves attending to the worldly cause of the sound; in acousmatic experience, sound is detached from that cause. The acousmatic concept originates with Pythagoras, and was developed in the work of 20th century musique concrete composers such as Pierre Schaeffer. The concept yields important insights into the nature of musical experience, but Scruton's version of the acousmatic thesis cannot overcome objections arising from timbral and spatial aspects of music, which seem to relate sounds to the circumstances of their production. These objections arise in part from music's status as a performing art rooted in human gesture and behaviour. Hence I defend a two-fold thesis of "hearing-in", which parallels Richard Wollheim's concept of "seeing-in": both acousmatic and non-acousmatic experience are genuinely musical and fundamental aspects of musical experience. Musical sounds are essentially part of the human and material worlds. While the acousmatic thesis is ultimately unpersuasive, however, the concept of the acousmatic places an interesting interpretation on traditional debates. It is also the case that a more developed musical understanding tends towards the acousmatic. I conclude by considering some implications for the metaphysics of sound, arguing that the two-fold thesis of the experience of music implies that one can experience the location and production of sounds through hearing alone.

Abstract
Elitism today is the residue of the liberal scepticism concerning democratic government. Classical liberals in the early decades of the 19th century had profound forebodings concerning the apparently inevitable advent of democracy. In response, they advocated elitism as a brake on the "tyranny of the majority". While other liberals were concerned with the danger of "democratic despotism", J.S. Mill meant diagnosed a culture of mediocrity engendered by democratic forms of government. Mill at first followed Coleridge and Comte in espousing illiberal elitism, the view that the intellectual and cultural elite should constitute an estate of society - a Church or Caste with formal powers. He subsequently rejected illiberal elitism on the grounds that it did not foster individual autonomy, but still maintained liberal elitism, according to which the intellectual elite must exert influence through recognition of their authority in their sphere. In On Liberty his position is further nuanced, so that it is questionable whether he really was an elitist at all. I advocate a position that constitutes a middle way between elitism and populism. Elitism should be contrasted with populism, and not with (i) egalitarianism, or (ii) individualism in the sense of Mill's Liberty Principle. I conclude by considering the relation between elitism and a meritocratic standpoint which affirms individual autonomy.